2012 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

5-1-2012

USA v. Alfonso Carter

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012

Recommended Citation
"USA v. Alfonso Carter" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 1053.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/1053

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 10-3152
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ALFONSO F. CARTER,
Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(No. 0314-1:1-99-cr-00099-001)
District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
Tuesday, January 24, 2012
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, FISHER, and GREENAWAY, Jr., Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: May 1, 2012)
_____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_____________
McKEE, Chief Judge.
Alfonso Carter appeals the District Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. Although Carter attempts to frame several issues for appeal, the
Certificate of Appealability that this Court granted after the District Court denied his
claim for habeas relief was limited to a single issue. That issue is whether the District

Court erred in denying his habeas petition without a hearing on his claim that counsel
was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object to his career offender designation at
sentencing. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
I.
Since we write primarily for the parties, we need not recite the underlying facts or
procedural history of this appeal.
The Pre-Sentence Report that was completed after Carter pled guilty to possession
with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base classified him as a career offender
under § 4B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines. That classification was based on two 1993
controlled substance convictions and one 1998 simple assault conviction. However,
Carter also had another controlled substance conviction in state court in 1999.1
Thereafter, Carter filed a motion to vacate the sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
The District Court denied that motion without an evidentiary hearing and this appeal
followed.
II.
28 U.S.C. § 2255 requires the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing before
ruling “unless the motion and files and records of the case show conclusively that the
movant is not entitled to relief.” Government of the Virgin Islands v. Forte, 865 F.2d 59,
62 (3d Cir. 1989). “In considering a motion to vacate a defendant’s sentence, the court
must accept the truth of the movant’s factual allegations unless they are clearly frivolous
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Although, the 1999 conviction was subsequently vacated by the Pennsylvania Superior
Court, it was eventually reinstated.
2

on the basis of the existing record.” United States v. Lilly, 536 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir.
2008) (alteration omitted) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Carter’s claim for habeas relief arises from the District Court’s conclusion that he
should be sentenced as a career offender.
A defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was at
least eighteen years old at the time the defendant committed the
instant offense of conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction is
a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance
offense; and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony
convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance
offense.
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). When applying § 4B1.1, two prior convictions must be “counted
separately under the provisions of §4A1.1(a), (b), or (c).” Id. § 4B1.2(c)(2). “Prior
sentences always are counted separately if the sentences were imposed for offenses that
were separated by an intervening arrest (i.e., the defendant is arrested for the first offense
prior to committing the second offense).” Id. § 4A1.2(a)(2).
Carter claims that the record does not indicate whether he committed his second
offense before or after he was arrested for his initial offense. His second conviction in
1993 was for delivering cocaine to a minor. Carter argues that the record does not
indicate when he delivered the cocaine to the minor and that he could have delivered the
cocaine to the minor prior to his first arrest, which occurred in July of 1992.
However, the record clearly indicates that Carter delivered the cocaine to the
minor on October, 10, 1992, the same day the minor sold the cocaine to an undercover
officer, i.e., October 10, 1992, after his first arrest. PSR 31 Moreover, as noted by the
District Court, Carter had a third controlled substance conviction in 1999, which also
3

qualifies as a predicate conviction for his career offender designation. Thus, even if the
two 1993 convictions counted as one conviction for purposes of § 4B1.1, Carter’s career
offender designation still would have been proper. Accordingly, the District Court did
not need to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the merit of Carter’s habeas petition.
III.
For the reasons stated above, Carter’s counsel was not ineffective in failing to
object to the career offender designation, and the District Court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Carter’s § 2255 motion without an evidentiary hearing. We shall
affirm the Order of the District Court.

4

